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L’Italia ha affrontato, negli ultimi 15 anni, un eccezionale sforzo
finanziario per costruire circa 1 000 km di linee ferroviarie ad alta
velocità. Ulteriori estensioni sono attualmente in costruzione o sono
state pianificate, in particolare sulle principali relazioni internaziona-
li. Questa rete è comunemente considerata fondamentale nella vi-
sione europea di un sistema di trasporto continentale.
Questo articolo analizza il passato ed il futuro di questa rete, laddove
possibile da un punto di vista quantitativo. La prima parte dell’arti-
colo ripercorre la storia del progetto Alta Velocità, soffermandosi in
particolare sulle questioni relative alla regolazione degli investimen-
ti ed alle vicende finanziarie nelle prime fasi ed alle questioni attuali
relative alla regolazione dei servizi ferroviari.
Nella seconda parte l’analisi dell’offerta, dei guadagni di tempo
permessi, della domanda e dei costi permette di sviluppare una
valutazione ex post – semplificata ma indipendente - dei progetti
realizzati, sottolineandone i successi e le potenzialità ancora
inespresse, ma anche le significative criticità.
L’ultima parte dell’articolo analizza i piani di espansione futura, con-
frontando i costi, la domanda esistente e quella attesa. Tale analisi
permette di derivare alcune indicazioni di politica dei trasporti e
strategie di riduzione dei costi, al fine di controllare la spesa pubbli-
ca in un periodo di crisi, senza abbandonare l’idea di una rete
ferroviaria moderna ed efficace.
Italy has undergone, in the last 15 years, an exceptional public
financial effort to build approximately 1,000 km of high speed rail
lines. Further extensions are under construction or planned,
especially in the most important international relations. This network
is widely considered as fundamental to comply the European vision
of a continental-wide transport system.
The paper analyses the past and the future of such network, where
possible from a quantitative point of view. The first part of the
article reviews the history of the Alta Velocità scheme, particularly
focusing on the issues related to the economic regulation of the
investments and the financial troubles at first and then on the
present issues related to the regulation of rail services.
The analysis of the supply, the time gains, the demand and the
costs allows to build a simple but independent evaluation of the
past projects from an ex-post perspective, pointing out the
successes, but also important critical issues.
The second part of the paper analyses the future expansion plans
looking at the costs, the existing and expected demand and derives
some policy indications and cost reduction strategies capable both
to control public expenditure in a period of crisis and not to abandon
the idea of a modern and effective rail network.
JEL classification: D61, L92, R42.
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Introduction: the Italian High Speed project
History of projects
The Italian High Speed Railway (in Italian “Alta Velocità”)
was conceived in 1990 as a new system, substantially
independent from the rest of the network, to provide fast
links among the cities of Turin, Milan, Bologna, Florence,
Rome and Naples (RFI 2007), along the “backbone” line of
the country. Soon, the former model inspired to the well
known French system, turned into something different,
namely a new high performance doubling of the existing
network, but completely integrated with it trough numerous
interconnections and despite the different voltage. In 1996,
according to this new vision, the name of the planned
system was changed into AV/AC (acronym of High Speed/
High Capacity, in Italian “Alta Velocità/Alta Capacità”). It
conceived the new lines as high capacity fast doublings,
capable to host heavy freight trains thanks to low slopes,
together with high speed passengers trains. This radical
change was official ly inspired by environmentalist
stakeholders, aiming at making the rail mode attractive also
to freight, thanks to higher speed and performance, and
thus helping modal shift.
Works of the first phase lasted more than a decade and
were recently completed in the main parts. To date, the
Italian high speed network is made of the sections listed in
Table 1 and represented in Figure 1. The full Turin – Salerno
axis, excluding only Florence and Bologna urban sections,
has been completed on December 2009.
Table 1 clearly points out one of the main differences in
the current network, homogeneous only in appearance.
The Florence – Rome line is much older and was essentially
a fast doubling of a conventional line, still using the normal
Italian voltage of 3kV DC. The rest of the line Turin – Naples
is the core of the project conceived in the Nineties and
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adopts the French standards of 25kV AC. It requires specific
high speed rolling stock. The two end sections of the Milan
– Venice line, not yet existing as a whole, adopt the same
3 kV DC standard and must be seen again as a fast doubling
due to capacity reasons, not used
by high speed trains only. Finally, the
Verona – Bologna line must be
mentioned. It was doubled and
upgraded in the same period and
opened in 2009 as an high perfor-
mance traditional l ine and is
currently used by the High Speed
services to Rome by multi-power fast
trains.
Currently, high speed programmes
count numerous new lines to be
built (see Figure 1). The main one
will connect Milan to Venice, linking
numerous mid-sized cities at short
distance. Other lines will connect
Milan to Genoa, Naples to Bari and
Naples to southern regions.
However, the largest and most
expensive projects underway aim at
connecting Italy to neighbour
countries trough the Alps: the Frejus
line (Turin – Lyon), the Brenner line
(Verona – Munich), the Trieste –
Divaca line. Not all the mentioned
projects are already fully defined and
financed.
In the period between the first
projects and now, the functional
model changed again. While all new
lines, except the Brenner, were
originally presented as High Speed
Italian high speed network operating sections (June 2011) (Table 1).
lines, the lack of significant passenger traffic turned them
to high capacity lines, supposed to host both heavy freight
trains and fast passengers trains. This is particularly true for
the expensive Alpine crossings. Finally, during 2011, the
High speed infrastructure in Italy (June 2009, source RFI website www.rfi.it.)
(Figure 1).
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scarcity of public funds suggested a new wave of design
characteristics, defined by policy makers as “frugale
infrastructures”1. In this case the lacking lines, with scarce
traffic compared to the capacity of a full new line, should
be built progressively and preferring selective doublings or
technological upgrades (ResPublica 2010).
Shifting from infrastructures to passenger services, since
2009 a new commercial product has been introduced by
the monopolist Trenitalia, named “le Frecce” (“the Arrows”).
In the following years the network has been widened and
fine-tuned. Currently, Frecciarossa is the brand for full high
speed products using the Turin – Naples line; Frecciargento
the one for other high speed services linking Rome with
the other important cities and only partially using the HS
network (Bolzano, Verona, Venice, Udine, Bari, Reggio
Calabria); Frecciabianca the one for the other top-grade
services not using the high speed lines, because not existing
yet (mainly Turin – Milan – Venice, Genova – Rome and
Milan – Bari) or because of different commercial choices.
Not yet operative, a private newcomer – NTV – is expected
to offer services in open access regime since 2012 on the
main line Turin – Milan – Rome – Naples.
The governance and the regulatory context of Italian
railways
Italian railways apply the European directives concerning
unbundling of network and services. Both the service branch
Trenitalia and the infrastructure branch RFI are owned by
the same public holding, Ferrovie dello Stato2.
Looking at the network, it remains an unregulated legal
monopoly, as the whole national network, including the
new High Speed lines, has been directly franchised (that
is, without competitive tendering) as a legal monopoly to
RFI – Rete Ferroviaria Italiana, the network manager of the
State-owned holding FS3, for 60 years since 2001. Such
natural monopoly is not subject to any regulatory mechanism
concerning efficiency: the subsidies and the investments
are ruled by a Programme Contract; tolls are decided by
the Ministry of Transport, but using only the relevant
information and the costs of RFI itself.
Looking at passengers services, Trenitalia remains by far
the dominant operator. In 2003 Italy implemented the
European Directives on rail competition (2001/12/CE, 2001/
13/CE and 2001/14/CE) into the Decreto Legislativo n. 188
High speed (Frecciarossa, on the left) and medium-high speed (Frecciargento, on the right) services in Italy (source: FS
2010) (Figure 2).
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of 8 July 2003. It states that long distance passenger
services ought to be opened to competition in the market.
As a result, two newcomers (Arenaways and NTV) rose to
compete with Trenitalia. The first started operating on the
Milan Turin, but already closed due to normative barriers
imposed. The latter is expected to start on high speed
services. A regulatory body for services only has been
created recently (2009) inside the Ministry of Transport,
with the name of Ufficio per la regolazione dei servizi ferro-
viari (URSF).
The relative openness of the 2003 decree (in particular,
the easiness to obtain the licence and the slots. Beria et al.
2010) is perceived as a threat by the incumbent that actually
succeeded in partially blocking the competition by means
of rising more restrictive entrance barriers or by the increase
in the costs of the network. In particular, the 2012 Financial
Law4 requires high speed users, including the newcomers,
to pay an extra train access charge to cross finance social
services.
The regulation of investments
In the initial intentions of the Nineties, the new HS line
should have been built through Project Financing by a new
mixed society, called TAV SpA, with a 60% of private capital
to be completely repaid. However in 1998 the State had
already to buy back the whole shares of TAV, due to the
unavailability of private shareholders to provide entitled
capitals (RFI 2007). The process of re-nationalisation of TAV
SpA lasted from 2000 to 2007 and ended with the coverage
of 13 billion Euros of debt by the State balance (Beria and
Ponti 2009). Today TAV SpA is no more operative as a
project financing subject.
In the meantime, the costs of the Turin – Salerno axis rose
from expected 10.7 billion € in 1992 to actual 32.0 billion €
in 2006, meaning a doubling of costs in real terms (RFI
2007)5. Moreover the lines cost reached, on average, 32
M€/km, compared to 10 M€/km in France and 9 M€/km in
Spain. This extraordinarily high costs have been analysed in
a public consultation to the Parliament by RFI in 2007 (and
reported by the Corte dei Conti 2009, pag. 19). They
pointed out the following causes of extra-costs:
– Direct award to General Contractors (4.0-6.0 M€/km);
– Project specificities due to orography and seismic of
Italian land (6.7-7.0 M€/km);
– Environmental and landscape compatibility (5.0-6.0 M€/
km);
– Land use issues and urbanisation (1.5-2.0 M€/km);
– Technology innovation and newer safety rules (1.5-2.0
M€/km).
While the latter issues cannot be commented without
entering into the details of the design choices, the first
one – the direct awarding to General Contractor – reveals
a severe governance process that could have been avoided
and that makes the Italian case different to any other
example in Europe.
According to the CEO of Ferrovie dello Stato, in fact, the
choice to award the construction of an entire line without
a competitive tendering process to select the best
contractor, caused an extra-cost of 14 to 20%, quantified
in 4 to 6 millions Euro per km of line. Moreover, a problem
of overdesign seems to exist and also the cost of
compensations rose significantly to gain the acceptance of
local authorities to new lines.
Eventually, the totality of costs associated to the High
Speed project up to now have been totally paid by the
state budget as capital expenditure. Moreover, such effort
has been done on the basis of extremely weak evaluations
and without public and detailed estimations of expected
demand. In the following we will try an independent
assessment of the results.
Ex-post analysis of the existing Turin – Salerno line
In this section we carry out an early ex-post evaluation of
the existing high speed network in Italy, one year and a
half after the full start of the new services on December
2009, progressively activated since 2006. We evaluate the
sections of the line through a standard and simplified cost-
benefit benchmark, as suggested by de Rus and Nombela
(2007) and de Rus and Nash (2007), presented in the
following.
As studies on traffic elasticity suggest (for example, Litman
2010), demand usually needs at least five years in order to
fully respond to reductions in travel t ime. So, a
comprehensive and robust enough ex-post evaluation
should be done only after such a time. However, the number
of frequencies supplied on the lines looks now quite stable
after the first years of operations and we think that it is
already possible to draw some early considerations and to
learn some lessons, in order to improve the planning of
new lines.
A review of the (few) data available
Only a few data are nowadays available on High Speed
demand in Italy. This fact is understandable from the
viewpoint of the railway undertaking Trenitalia, this being a
commercially sensitive information and considering that new
operators are willing to enter the market in the near futu-
re. However, it seems that more transparency from the
public side on the basic data and outcomes of one of the
largest public works undertaken in the last decade, would
benefit the public debate especially about planning new
lines. To make a comparison, full data on air routes
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passengers and frequencies are publicly available (in ENAC
2010), despite the higher level of competition present in
air sector.
The data available specifically on HS lines is of two types:
the timetable and some press releases with extremely ag-
gregate data on ridership and average load factors. Ferro-
vie dello Stato declared that about 20 million tickets were
sold in 2010 for high speed services (FS 2010), that is all
Frecciarossa and Frecciargento trains (those in Figure 2).
No information about average travel distance is available.
In addition, some national newspapers reported that about
3 million passengers travelled6 the direct Milan – Rome
relation in 2010 (ItaliaOggi 2010), that is not counting
passengers starting or ending trips in the intermediate stops
of Bologna and Florence. A recent paper (Cascetta et al.
2011) gives very disaggregated data about the Rome –
Naples link, reporting 1.4 million passengers. Such data refers
however to 2007: high speed services started on line in
2006, but the new infrastructure was not completed with
final urban penetrations up to 2009, so time savings were
still limited (1h27 vs. 1h10 today) and present ridership
should be increased. Finally, other non official estimates
report a traffic of 1.5 million passengers travelling on the
Turin – Milan link, out of which 1.0 million travelling to Milan
and 0.5 million continuing to other destinations southward.
Further data on traffic is available on Trenitalia balance
sheets, but they never refer to HS lines/services only and
include the whole long distance branch.
On the basis of this very limited information we try to
distribute total declared demand on the network, using a
very simple gravitational model, with the typical form in
Equation (1). It must be noticed that the model has no
statistical significance, but more consistent simulations are
impossible due to the lack of sufficient observations to
calibrate the model. For this reason, the model will not be
used for predictions, but only to distribute the declared
total 2010 passengers. To cope with such limitedness, we
will accompany the following CBA results with sensitivity
analysis.
The model considers an Origin-Destination matrix of n×n
zone; Tij is the number of expected trips from origin zone
i to destination zone j, Pi and Pj are the populations of i and
j; Cij  is a travel cost friction factor, while α and β are calibration
parameters.
We adapt this standard definition for our purpose by:
– using total passenger traffic in stations7 Paxx as a proxy
of “rail” populations. The number of inhabitants would
be too rough, also because needs to define the
catchment area of each station. The total passenger
traffic in stations might represent both the dimension
of the urban area (i.e. the catchment area), the
dimension of rail market and the “propensity” of
inhabitants to use rail;
– developing a cost friction factor with a Cobb-Douglas
function proportional to high speed service travel time
(in minutes) and inversely proportional to service
frequency (in HS connections/day, with γ<0, excluding
trains not using the lines and thus not included in the
observation of total traffic).
As a consequence, the form used is the one in Equation
(2).
We build an 8×8 matrix made of the following zones: Turin,
Milan, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples, Verona and Venice/
Padua. Such matrix ignores trips using the services
continuing northbound and southbound the main axes Turin
– Naples and Venice – Naples8. We estimate that ignoring
those services should make us lose some 1.2 million
passenger in 20109, that we initially remove from the total
during the calibration phase. Data on frequencies and time
is taken from Trenitalia 2010 timetable10.
This distribution model estimates the values in Table 2 and
gives the results of Figure 3.
The map shows that the core of demand is between Bolo-
gna and Rome, where the large demand from Milan and
the smaller from Verona and Venice sum up. Moreover, from
Comparison among simulated and reference values for demand on available Italian HSR sections (Table 2).
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Bologna to Florence nearly all links are classified as HS and
just a handful of regional connections still exist. To the
contrary, Turin – Milan and Rome – Naples have a very limited
demand because of competition from car, but also from
regional trains. In conclusion, only the line Milan – Rome
has a significant demand, while the rest is scarcely used,
even when a new line exist (Turin and Naples).
A stylised Cost Benefit Analysis to assess the socio-economic
effects
The demand itself is not a sufficient indicator of economic
success/insuccess of an investment, being at least also the
cost relevant. To assess such results also from an economic
perspective we then move to a CBA perspective.
To do that, in a context of missing data, we refer to De
Rus and Nombela (2007) and de Rus and Nash (2007),
that proposed a simplified cost benefit methodology to make
broad comparative evaluations of high speed railways. They
develop a comprehensive formula to estimate first year
passenger traffic to justify the investment on the basis of
travel time savings and cost differences with respect to
the former situation. This obviously ignores a lot of aspects
related to HSR schemes, for example environmental and
decongestion benefits due to mode shift. However most
of the evaluations made on HSR made it clear that travel
time savings are by far the most important benefit of such
projects, and that it is not possible to justify HSR investments
only on the basis of environmental reasons. We will
comment and roughly quantify the dimension of such
ignored effects later in the paper.
The authors built the Formula (3) that estimates the Q0
first year diverted demand from conventional rail to high
speed rail in order to have NPV=0. All the needed
parameters are listed and briefly described in Table 3.
In fact, as we are looking at current traffic on the network,
we will estimate total traffic after the construction of the
Parameter used by the model (de Rus & Nombela 2007; de Rus &
Nash 2007) (Table 3).
new rail link, that is high speed traffic on first year in Equation
(4).
We set the parameters described in Table 2 as: v = 20 €/
hour-pax, α = 50%11, r = 3.5%, θ = 3.00% and T = 40
years. We set economic investment value to be 80% of its
financial cost to consider transfers and macroeconomic
effects, and we consider a residual value – in the last year
of analysis – of 50% of the economic investment (as
suggested by the same authors of the model).
Available data confirm the fixed maintenance and operating
costs (Ct) suggested by Campos and de Rus (2009) to be
of the order of 30,000 € per kilometre of single track of
high speed rail in Europe12. Finally, economic train operating
costs of high speed trains are calculated by the Italian
transport network manager (RFI 2005) to be 9 €/train-km
for high speed trains and 10 €/train-km for conventional
long distance trains. We thus estimate Cq and Cc multiplying
those value for the number of new high speed trains and
the one of conventional trains removed.
On the basis of this model we then estimate the needed
demand to justify the investment on the basis of benefits
in terms of time reduction and operating costs, in Table 4.
Comparing the needed demand with the simulated current
traffic and with Trenitalia load factor targets (see Figure 4)
we can have a first picture of the socio-economic results of
the investment, considering that other benefits
(environmental, congestion and wider benefits) exist but
are not changing the overall result (see afterwards).
The results of our simulation in Table 4 suggest that the
achieved time and operating cost savings alone do not justify
the investment in any of the considered sections, except
the Milan-Bologna one in the most optimistic case. The
section, together with the Bologna – Florence section,
could achieve positive or marginal economic results
considering the other than direct benefits, as we will discuss
in a while. The balance seems instead negative for the
Rome – Naples section and very negative for the Turin –
Milan section. We will comment such results in the
concluding section.
To complete the picture, as said, values in Table 4
have been estimated on the basis of time and
operating costs savings only. It must be recognised
that other significant benefits exist, even if usually
minor (Nash 2009) and not capable of changing a
result other than marginal:
– mode shift can provide a reduction in external
costs13, both in the shift from car and from airplane.
Cascetta et al. (2011) evidenced that 7.8% of
the HS users were diverted from car on the Rome-
Naples section in 2007. To assess the value of those
external costs saving it would be crucial to
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Representation of estimated traffic on high speed services “Frecciarossa”
and “Frecciargento” in Italy 2010. Small points represent stops of
“Frecciargento” services outside the High Speed network, that have not been
modelled as single destinations. Source: our elaboration on Wikimedia
Commons map (Figure 3).
Comparison among simulated demand and estimated demand needed to justify the investment, per section (Table 4).
understand which part of those diverted
users used to travel during peak hours,
when the non internalised part of external
costs is significant due to congestion (Nash
2009). Assuming the Rome – Naples as a
benchmarking, the amount of demand
shifted from car for all pairs (especially the
longer) is however irrelevant compared to
the overall highway traffic: no more than
2,000 cars/day on the most crowded
section. Data on air traffic shows a
decrease of 1.3 million passengers a year
(i.e., 647 million passenger-km. Our
elaborations on ENAC 2007 and 2010) on
city pairs linked to HSR, with respect to
the national trend (that showed a +5.31%
increase 2007-2010). Considering 1.1
€cent/pax-km (Nash 2009) of non
internalised external cost by plane, it
means a benefit of 7 M€ per year, i.e. 214
M€ of total actualised14 benefit. If we
compare this indicative value with the total
economic cost of the HSR of 17,700 M€,
plus the external costs of high speed train
operations and of the construction of the
new lines, we understand that the benefit
due to air pollution reduction is not
significant.
– the shift of high speed trains to the
new line releases new capacity for freight
and regional trains on the existing lines. If
those were close to saturation, this could
be a benefit. According to the last Italian
transport plan (MTN 2001), in the late
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Grafical comparison among simulated demand, 2010 demand according to Trenitalia
targets (Trenitalia 2007) and estimated demand needed to justify the investment, per
section (Figure 4).
Comparison of high speed services supplied by Trenitalia (“Frecciarossa” and
“Frecciargento”) in 2010 and 2011 (Table 5).
Nineties the Milan – Bologna line was close to saturation
between Piacenza and Bologna; also the Florence – Bo-
logna line and the western part of the Turin – Milan
(between Turin and Santhià) experienced high traffic
levels. Urban nodes represented the most acute capacity
problems: however new HS lines did not solve those
problems and even worsen them by generating new
traffic.
– wider economic benefits due to generated demand are
usually not considered in traditional cost benefit
analyses. Nash (2009) outlines that «leisure trips may
benefit the destination by bringing in tourist spending,
commuter and business trips reflect expansion or
relocation of jobs or homes or additional economic
activity». However there is still debate on whether these
changes really are additional economic activity or whether
it is simply relocated. Those benefits are usually
significant for projects connecting depressed areas to
economic centres and when the reduction in generalised
travel costs is large. Typically, infrastructures generate
significant wider economic effects in
developing economies. European
detailed calculations are rare. The
estimated value of those benefits for
the first section (London – West
Midlands) of the planned British High
Speed 2, a project costing 17,800
M€, is 4,000 M€15 (DfT 2011). Rules
of thumb suggest values of 10 to
20% of direct benefits in the best
cases (Nash 2009, but also the World
Bank).
Final ly, the used value of
expected traffic growth θ of 3%
per year may appear as rather
optimistic. However, one must
consider that in the first years
of operation traffic is expected
to grow at faster rates, as the
comparison of the supply in
2010 and 2011 in Table 5
suggests. This may be due to
some facts:
– people needs time to change
their behaviour (Litman 2010)
as a response to a reduction in
travel times, in particular when
it comes to change residence
or workplace;
– a new open-access train
operating company (NTV) is
expected to enter the market
in 2012, with a significant
increasing in the supply of services. In particular it will
be interesting to observe if competition with the public
incumbent Trenitalia will generate a reduction in average
fares and more complex yield management with more
low price offers. The combination of new supply and
reduced fares should anyway attract new demand to
HS services.
Comments on the ex-post analysis
A first comment can be spent on the demand.
The lines in operation, from Turin to Naples – Salerno, are
the core of Italian long distance traffic, connecting the
most important urban areas with the exception of West-
East line from Turin to Venice. For this reason, one can
expect that this line will be the most used even if the
network will increase. Moreover, the distances involved are
those suggested as the most suitable for HS trains.
However, only the central section of the line, from Milan to
Rome, has a significant amount of demand. The two marginal
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sections, connecting the large cities of Turin and Naples
with the mainline (but also Verona, even if not at 300 km/
h) have much less travelers and trains far from the line
capacity.
We try to suggest possible explanations for such
disappointing outcomes: the Turin-Milan relation seems to
be made of significant relations among intermediate origins
and destinations (e.g. Vercelli-Milan, Novara-Turin, etc.),
which cannot be served by high speed trains, but would
have benefited from faster inter-city services16.
Probably, if the line would have been designed and built
with lower standards (similar to those of the Florence-Rome
in Table 1) the balance would have been much better,
with slightly lower benefits for the direct Milan-Turin relation,
but significant benefits for other origins and destinations
on the line.
Main planned AV/AC projects (MIT 2010). Some projects don’t have high speed (AV) characteristics and are classified
as high capacity (AC). Figures in parenthesis are considered as second phases of projects (Table 6).
The Rome-Naples relation probably suffers from the fact
that the two big metropolitan areas experience very high
travel times to the respective central stations, so that a
fast connection between city centres marginally benefits
the connections among the big peripheral areas.
Concerning the socio-economic assessment, even if demand
results quite good (near to the major European HS lines)
and benefits are high due to important time savings, the
socio-economic result is not satisfying. In all the sections,
except Milan – Bologna, the demand is no more than half
of the needed one to justify the public cost. The main
indication, especially for the central section, is then on the
cost side: if the line would have had the expected cost
and not the double or more, or if costs would have been in
line with European average, the whole line from Milan to
Rome would have been positive.
Comparison among current and expected passenger rail traffic (in trains/day) - as forecast by the official documents
(our elaboration on sources). Forecasted values for the Brennero and Frejus base tunnels refer to the complete new
line. For the Frejus, the secondary souce elaborates the complex official estimations (Table 7).
24
Ricerche
TeMA
03.11
TeMA  Vol 4  No 3 settembre 2011
Ex-ante considerations on planned extensions
A long list of projects related to the High Speed/High
Capacity network expansion are at stake in Italy, already
depicted in Figure 1. In the following we will refer to the
major projects included in the last public document released
by the Italian Ministry of Transport – the Strategic
Infrastructure Program (MIT 2010) – which can be
considered the most recent planning document, even if
not giving any reference to actual and forecasted demand
and lacks of cost-benefit considerations.
Expected demand, cost and performance
In absence of detailed data necessary to carry a full CBA,
we will present in this section a first benchmark of the
costs, of the present demand and of the official estimations
on expected traffic for the main projects under
consideration (Table 6). Among them, the Brennero base
tunnel is part of the Verona – Munich high speed line, and
the Frejus base tunnel is part of the Turin – Lyon high
speed line. The Treviglio – Brescia – Verona – Padova is the
central part of the Milan – Venice high speed line, whose
extreme parts (Milan – Treviglio and Padua – Venice) have
been already built with no high speed standard (see Table
1).
Similarly to the existing lines, also the new links are supposed
to be interested by both passenger and freight traffic17.
Three of them, the Brennero, the Frejus and the Third
Giovi pass, are mainly freight lines.
Comparison among current and expected freight rail traffic (in trains/Year) - as forecasted by the official documents (our
elaboration on sources) (Table 8).
In Table 7 and Table 8 we report traffic values – current
and forecasted – for considered projects. The same values
are comparatively commented in the next paragraph (Figu-
re 5 and Figure 6).
A comparative assessment of planned extensions
Comparing official estimations with current demand (Figure
5 for passengers and Figure 6 for freight), we can derive
the following indications:
– All lines are expected to heavily increasing the present
demand: often doubling for passengers and two to five
times increasing for freight. These trends, if looked
together and not singularly, appear very optimistic and
in contrast with pre-crisis steady trends (see Trenitalia
balance sheets).
– The Naples – Bari line appears comparatively weak from
any point of view: few passengers, few freight and
moderate time savings18. Since the existing line is
obsolete, this means that if an investment is needed,
this must not be a huge and costly HS line, but a cheaper
but effective doubling and modernisation. Otherwise,
the line should be ranked low due to its large cost.
– The Frejus tunnel and line is the project whose freight
demand is expected to increase more (nearly five times
the 2007 pre-crisis values). In our opinion this is hardly
unjustifiable since the relation has continously lost traffic
in the last decade19. According to forecasts, it is instead
expected to overcome the Brenner line, which today
experiences two times more traffic.
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– Very high demand is expected on the Milan – Venice
and this is realistic. However, the lessons learnt from
the Milan – Turin line should not be forgotten: the
presence of many medium sizes cities and Venice not
being a big and dense metropolis20 suggest that average
trip distances should be low (100-200 km) and demand
should not be concentrated but spread among many
OD couples. Thus, the pure speed is probably not
needed like from Milan to Rome and the investment
should focus on increasing capacity, reliability and
frequency of intercity trains, following the German or
Swiss examples.
– The Brenner is the only project in which a saturation of
the concurrent mode – the motorway – seems possible,
while the others expect a future saturation of existing
rail.
– The Brenner and the Frejus lines have opposite capacity
problems: the first one has a capacity problem on long
distance freight trains and the latter on regional trains
near Turin. The two projects should take into account
this, preferring a doubling of the line around Turin before
the doubling of the pass line; the opposite is true for
the Brenner.
– A huge freight traffic in expected on the Third Giovi
pass, but one must take into consideration the capacity
and the performances of the Genoa port. Moreover,
the present line is actually a 5 tracks connection,
characterised by strong slopes (up to 35‰) but with a
capacity of 450 trains/
day and a potentiality of
700 (Gronda di Genova
2009), the double of
existing demand.
Concluding remarks
Summary of results
In the paper we faced
two issues: to evaluate
ex-post the demand
and the results of the
new Italian HS l ines
between Turin – Milan
– Rome – Naples and
Verona – Bologna, and
to provide a comparison
of future extensions.
For the first question,
we built a simple
distribution model to
reconstruct the OD
matrix starting from the very limited demand data available.
We estimated the flows on the sections of the line and in
general on the HS trains classified with the commercial name
of “Frecciarossa” and “Frecciargento”. The most used
sections are the central ones between Milan to Rome, with
flows ranging from 6 to 12 Mpax/year in 2010. The other
HS sections to Turin and Naples have much less demand,
below any expectation and far below the capacity of the
line, used exclusively for HS trains.
These results on demand, partially positive, partially negati-
ve, translate into a variable judgement from the socio-
economic viewpoint: it is marginally positive for the Milan –
Bologna line and potentially marginally positive for the
expensive Bologna – Florence tunnel.
Instead, neither the environmental benefits of shift from
air (approx 250M€ overall in 40 years), the possible wider
economic benefits (no more than 10 to 20% more, in the
most optimistic case), the reduction of congestions (very
small and concentrated around urban areas only) and the
expansion of capacity (that was already sufficient), can
change the result of non-core sections, namely the Turin –
Milan, the Rome – Naples. In all cases, the socio-economic
benefits – although benefits are sometimes very high –
have been dramatically reduced especially by the investment
cost, that have been overwhelmingly high compared to
similar European lines and substantially underestimated.
Future extensions, with the relevant exception of Milan –
Venice doubling, appears to be more and more marginal
Graphical comparison among current and expected passenger rail traffic (in trains/day) - as
forecasted by the official documents - on the planned new line (our elaboration on sources)
(Figure 5).
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compared to the Milan – Rome line. All forecasts appear to
be extremely optimistic, foreseeing doublings of demand
on all lines. Being their expected costs similar or higher than
existing lines, the socio-economic result cannot be better.
Policy indications
The analysis allows us to suggest some policy indications:
– Some priorities between new lines are needed: the
whole cost cannot be paid at once and the best projects
must be chosen, being their forecasts already very
different. The demand already gives an indication on
which lines must be preferred, but an extensive and
comparative CBA is needed.
– Radical cost reduction strategies must be applied. Costs
are too high compared to European standards. A
relevant part of such extra-cost is due to non competitive
awarding for construction. A problem of overdesign
seems also to exist.
– In particular, the model of High Speed lines must be
overcome, since passenger demand on those lines is
less and less and potential time savings are not changing
behaviours substantially. Similarly, also the mixed-model
Graphical comparison among current and expected freight rail traffic (in trains/year) - as forecasted
by the official documents - on the planned new lines (our elaboration on sources) (Figure 6).
of High Speed / High
Capacity, peculiar of
the Italian network, did
not work and
determined higher
costs. Those lines that
are expected to host
mainly freight traffic
(the three mountain
passes) should be
designed for freight
traffic only. The Milan
– Venice line should be
conceived as a high
capaci ty l ine,  with
good standards, but
without ignoring the
fact that 250 or 300
km/h of design speed
will change average
travel times of just
few minutes. Minor
lines with no capacity
problems (Naples –
Bari) must be
upgraded, but at the
lowest possible cost,
finding the best trade
off between time
savings and public
expenditure.
– An interesting strategy is that of dividing the project
into functional sections and analysing them with a
phasing approach: a line can be built progressively,
and the characteristics of extensions can be changed
according to how demand responded. In this way
one can obtain the same benefits at lower and diluted
cost and, more important, reducing the risk of
overinvestment (see Debernardi et al. 2011).
– Much attention must be spent on nodes, i.e. the place
of the network where true capacity problems exist
and where capacity and speed improvements give the
better payoff.
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Notes
1 Sole 24 Ore, “Opere più frugali per coinvolgere i privati”.
2 Ferrovie dello Stato turned his name to Ferrovie dello Stato
Italiane in mid 2011.
3 Concession Act: Decreto Ministeriale n. 138T del 31 ottobre
2000, Ministero dei Trasporti e della Navigazione.
4 D.L. “Disposizioni urgenti per la stabilizzazione finanziaria”, 12
luglio 2011, art. 21.4.
5 10.7 billion Euro1994 is equal to 15.5 billion Euro2006 (RFI 2007).
6 Actually the number refers to total year projections made on
the basis of tickets sold up to October 2010.
7 Data are taken from station managers websites,
www.grandistazioni.it and www.centostazioni.it. We sum all
passengers using stations where high speed services start in
each city. Turin Porta Susa station is managed directly by RFI
and no data is available: we hypothesize a value of 15 million
passengers.
8 Some trains continue northbound of Verona (1 train couple to
Brescia, and 2 couples up to Bolzano), northbound of Venice (1
train couple up to Udine) and southbound of Naples (1 train
couple to Reggio Calabria and 4 couples to Bari/Lecce).
9 With the hypothesis that average load factor on those peripheral
sections is 200 passengers/train for trains to Reggio Calabria
and Bari, and 150 passengers/train for trains to Brescia, Bolzano
and Udine. Average High Speed load factor in 2007 was 215
(FS, 2007), but in this case the trains always continue to Rome
serving also some intermediate cities.
10 See Table 5 for part of the used values.
11 This average value is confirmed by FS (2009) for the Milan -
Rome relation, where a +50-60% of new demand is reported,
and by Cascetta et al. (2011), where 30.8% of the 2007 high
speed traffic between Rome and Naples is generated or diverted
from other non rail modes (i.e. +44.5% of existing demand).
12 RFI estimates for the planned Naples – Bari line unit costs of
56,000 M€ per kilometer of double track line.
13 Reduction in greenhouse gases due to HSR introduction is quite
controversial in general, even more in countries with high oil
dependence for electric energy production like Italy or Britain
(Nash, 2009).
14 Hypotesizing a traffic growth of 2%, a social discount rate of
3.5% and an horizon of 40 years.
15 However in Britain projects have to pass the cost-benefit test
without considering wider benefits.
16 This is reflected also in the current supply on the relation, that
is still made of 38 regional, 20 conventional long distance and
only 20 high speed services (Source: Trenitalia website
www.trenitalia.com, visited on September 2011. Simulated day:
12/10/2011).
17 Despite initial declarations, no freight traffic is using the existing
high speed network.
18 Comparing current timetables with forecasts (RFI 2009) time
savings are less than 1h in total.
19 Overall freight traffic (both on the road and on the rail) among
France and Italy decreased from 51 Mtons in 2000 to 48.1
Mtons in 2007, before dropping to 38.2 Mtons in 2009.
Considering only relations more strictly related to the project
(namely Frejus/Moncenisio, Monte Bianco and Monginevro),
values are 36.6 in 2000, 28.1 in 2007 and 20.7 in 2009 (BAV
2009).
20 Venice has 271k inhabitants and Padua 214k inhabitants.
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